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The Social Construction of Public Opinion
Abstract
Etymologically, 'opinion' has at least one foot in the idea of being able to think independently, of owning one's
thoughts, and the other in the idea of choice, of being able to have preferences, judge something one way or
another, or take one of several positions on a controversial issue. Having opinions implies being cognitively
autonomous, independent, but also somewhat unpredictable.
Although the word 'public' comes to us from Latin: as a noun it meant 'people,' and as an adjective, it meant
'accessible to all,' not restricted to private use. Two independent historians of the French revolution, Keither
Baker (1990) and Mona Ozouf (1988) have suggested that the noun phrase 'l'opinion pub-lique' was invented
and gained currency during the 18th century. They identified the word 'public opinion' as a purely linguistic
concept, void of a fixed or defi-nite referent. As a rhetorical device, 'public opinion' functioned similar to "pub-
lic tribunals," invoking the latter’s political legitimacy.
Today, newspapers tell us that public opinion favors one candidate over an-other, decides an election, is
concerned about an issue, is against a proposed legislation, likes to hear certain things, expresses its convictions
and acts accordingly. We read that public opinion can kill the reputation of a person, convict an accused, and
that political leaders cannot rule against it or eventually fail. In the news, public opinion appears to be an
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1 The common view 
What makes public opinion so powerful? 
 
Public 








Etymologically, ‘opinion’ has at least one foot in the idea of being able to think 
independently, of owning one’s thoughts, and the other in the idea of choice, of 
being able to have preferences, judge something one way or another, or take one 
of several positions on a controversial issue. Having opinions implies being 
cognitively autonomous, independent, but also somewhat unpredictable. 
Although the word ‘public’ comes to us from Latin: as a noun it meant 
‘people,’ and as an adjective, it meant ‘accessible to all,’ not restricted to private 
use. Two independent historians of the French revolution, Keither Baker (1990) 
and Mona Ozouf (1988) have suggested that the noun phrase ‘l’opinion pub-
lique’ was invented and gained currency during the 18th century. They identified 
the word ‘public opinion’ as a purely linguistic concept, void of a fixed or defi-
nite referent. As a rhetorical device, ‘public opinion’ functioned similar to “pub-
lic tribunals,” invoking the latter’s political legitimacy. 
Today, newspapers tell us that public opinion favors one candidate over an-
other, decides an election, is concerned about an issue, is against a proposed 
legislation, likes to hear certain things, expresses its convictions and acts accord-
ingly. We read that public opinion can kill the reputation of a person, convict an 
accused, and that political leaders cannot rule against it or eventually fail. In the 
news, public opinion appears to be an amazingly powerful political actor.  
Not surprisingly, governments, businesses, and political scientists take pub-
lic opinion seriously. Getting public opinion on one’s side has its costs. Candi-
dates for political office see the need to find out what the public wants and pay 
handsomely for that information in order to mount effective election campaigns. 
When trailing behind the frontrunner, a candidate might well proclaim not to 
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care about what pollsters say while secretly commissioning another survey to 
find more favorable opinions to report. Public opinion polls and their twins, 
public relation efforts and market research, are well-financed social techniques. 
Even social researchers are not immune to the power of public opinion. When 
applying for grants, they invoke it by arguing for the social significance of their 
proposed research. Public opinion is real, because, among many reasons, those 
who feel their effect pay for knowing what it is. 
Surely, public opinion is not a fact of nature that could be found somewhere 
unattended, nor is it a tangible artifact that could be manufactured and photo-
graphed. Declaring it not to exist (cf. Bourdieu 1979) or as a phantom of the 
imagination, would not facilitate understanding the phenomenon, just as when 
dismissing it as being subjective, irrational, imaginary, or a myth. It evidently is 
a social phenomenon, a social construction (cf. Herbst 1993), much like money, 
families, governments, wars, and Nobel prizes are. It has a reality that is consti-
tuted in what people do. It does not exist independent of human actions. But 
what makes it so powerful?  
It is the common use of language and its associated perception that makes 
public opinion into an undisputed fact. Saying that the public is concerned about 
something, favors something, is against something, decides something, likes to 
hear about something, supports something, has attitudes about something, ex-
presses its beliefs, and acts on them personifies the public. Personification (cf. 
Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 33f.) is the most pervasive metaphorical root of the social 
construction of public opinion. Personification makes actors out of objects, here 
out of an abstraction. 
To be clear: The public, the way we experience it, cannot literally speak, 
has no brain to think, no motor organs to act, and no purposes to pursue. Yet, 
everyday use of language attributes virtually all of these human mental abilities 
to the public: thinking, making up its mind, judging, and enacting its beliefs. It is 
the metaphor of personalization that makes the public into the powerful, volatile, 
and irrational ruler that people fear and need to be concerned with. Personifica-
tion grants the public an independent mind whose capricious and often unreason-
able nature can be dangerous for those who mess with it. Metaphors occur in 
language but achieve significance through their behavioural entailments. Exer-
cising power over individuals’ reputation, affecting businesses, and governments 
is an entailment of the metaphorical use of the word ‘public,’ nothing more than 
that. Baker (ibid.) and Ozouf (ibid.) were right in suggesting that the 18th century 
‘public opinion’ was a linguistic invention, but they did not quite recognize the 
metaphorical source of its reality and see its perceptual entailments.  
Sociologists and theorists of the public, see the public of public opinion 
rather differently. First of all, “public” contrasts with “private.” Public is what is 
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seen and done under the watchful eye of others, private is what is nobody else’s 
business except for the closest members of one’s family or trusted acquaintances. 
The public sphere is where everyone can go and mingle; the private sphere is 
limited to the privacy of one’s home. The French sociologist Gabriel Tarde saw 
the public as a conversation that takes place in the coffee houses of Paris and the 
salons of London.  
 “The political function of conversation, according to Tarde, is to percolate opinion 
– that is, to refine individual opinion so that it becomes more ‘considered’ and, in 
ways unspecified, to generate one or two national opinions on a particular subject” 
(cf. Katz 1998: 89).  
Here, public opinions are far from being mental constructions. They are asserted 
by individuals, collectively contemplated, and weeded out in conversations 
among citizens. Jürgen Habermas builds on Tarde’s notion by defining 
“’public sphere’ […] (as) a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public 
opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open to all citizens. A portion 
of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons 
come together to form a public. When a public is large, this kind of communication 
requires certain means of dissemination and influence; today newspapers and peri-
odicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (cf. Habermas 1991: 
398).  
Habermas’ conceives of public opinion as resulting from rational deliberations, 
not limited by power relationships that would constrain free expression. – How 
different their notions are from metaphorical talk in everyday life! 
Although Tarde and Habermas are the most outstanding theorists of public 
opinion and will serve as reference here, consensus among public opinion re-
searchers on their object of inquiry turns out to be rare. As early as in 1965, 
Harwood Childs surveyed the literature and identified 50 distinct definitions of 
public opinion (cf. Childs 1965). Some researchers refuse to define it, arguing, as 
Hermann Oncken did in 1914, “everybody knows exactly what public opinion 
means” (cf. Oncken cited in Noelle-Neumann 1993: 59). Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann (ibid.) suggests that the uncertainty about what public opinion is per-
sist to this day. However, what “everyone knows” and takes for granted is not 
much different from the common view of an indisputably powerful ruler who 
can determine individuals’ reputation, judge the conduct of governments, and 
settle whatever else matters to people. The power of public opinion derives from 
the personifying the abstraction called ‘public’ and it is its use in language that 
makes it so. 
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2 Public opinion as measured 





(2) Research as measurement 
Data Pollster
 
Pollsters claim their task to be one of measuring public opinion, “taking the 
pulse of the public.” The everyday use of the word ‘measurement’ assumes that 
(1) there is a reliable, i.e., replicable, measuring instrument, (2) there is some-
thing to be measured, and (3) the resulting measure accurately represents a qual-
ity of the measured object. Measurement conceptions also underlie social scien-
tific efforts to quantify social phenomena, rendering unambiguous and numeri-
cally calculable what would remain intractable otherwise. Moreover, and consis-
tent with (2), is the assumption that repeated measurements will not change the 
measured object. Indeed, texts on public opinion research describe public opin-
ion as existing independent of how and how many pollsters measure it. With 
such measurement conceptions in mind, the methodological issues of public 
opinion research then become reliability and validity – reliability in the sense 
that two polls taken of the same issues and at the same time agree with each 
other; and validity in the sense that polling results are independently verified, 
hence true. When polls that should have produced the same findings deviate 
from one another, the struggle begins about which one was on target and which 
was not and why. The use of these criteria in ensuing debates demonstrates 
measurement conceptions at work. 
Public opinion researchers, like all empirical researchers, could proceed by 
delineating their object of study, asking themselves where it occurs, going to the 
site of its manifestation, and inquiring into the processes that bring it about. But 
this is not what pollsters do. If they were, they might discover that there is much 
talk in public places about civic issues, politics, and neighbourhood problems, 
but no public opinion without a measuring effort. Thomas Osborne and Nikolas 
Rose (1999) use the example of public opinion research to affirmatively answer 
their more question “do the social sciences create phenomena?“ The idea of 
measurements actively creating social phenomena is incommensurate with the 
idea of passively attaching numbers to the dimensions of measured phenomena. 
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If researchers were interested in a collective behaviour that changes or di-
rects the dynamics of society – avoiding the mentalist construction of ‘opinion’ – 
they might be lead to other public “repertoires” (Tilly 1983) like riots, petitions, 
demonstrations, town hall meetings, refusals to paying taxes, lobbies, pressure 
groups, money flows to political parties, popular media content, and so on. But 
by calling their object of research ‘public opinion,’ pollsters confine themselves 
to find out what people say they think, believe, know, or judge. Privileging what 
people say over what people do is hard to justify, except, perhaps, in terms of 
methodological conveniences.  
Public opinion researchers could also reflect on how their use of the word 
‘public opinion’ directs their attention to generalizing the opinions of people, 
how the personification of the public leads them to attribute mental capabilities 
to what they are observing, in other words, how their use of language traps them 
into constructing what they believe they are facing and studying it as a powerful 
phenomenon. They would then have to realize and abandon the illusion of meas-
uring public opinion as existing independent of their talking about it, and inquire 
into the language that creates their interest in the phenomenon in question. Poll-
sters do not do this either. They tend to consider language as a means of obtain-
ing answers to relevant questions from interviewees, not as the source of lan-
guaging their own reality into being.  
Instead, pollsters are committed to apply their well-established, easily ex-
plainable, and hence widely popular measuring instruments, and blindly accept 
their results – notwithstanding that their object is constructed in language and 
has none of mental abilities that the metaphor entails. 
Measurement theory is a subspecies of the theory of representation and as-
sumes, as already noted in (2) above, the independent and prior existence of an 
object to be measured. According to (3), the task of measurement is to represent 
selected qualities of this object in quantitative terms. To be acceptable by fellow 
researchers, the resulting quantities need to be stated as objective facts (not bi-
ased or deviating from the truth), specific propositions (displaying a desired level 
of accuracy), of relatively invariant facts (not changing as the result of measure-
ment), and relevant to the theory or actions under consideration.  
The language of measurement theory permeates how pollsters describe 
much of their efforts. Pollsters have no qualms claiming that they have found the 
public to have a particular opinion, that the public is of a certain mind, and has 
spoken, judged, or decided an issue, and present quantitative measures in support 
of their claims. When polling results turn out to be unreliable, for example, after 
election predictions failed, people tend to look for two kinds of faults, without 
questioning the theory of measurement. Pollsters may be accused for the imper-
fect or incompetent use of the theoretically perfect measuring instruments, and 
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pollsters, in turn, may excuse themselves by blaming the public for changing 
their minds, for not sticking to the opinions they had just asserted. The first can 
be seen when pollsters are accused of political biases, questioned regarding their 
source of funding, the use of inadequate sample sizes, asking marginally relevant 
questions, or misrepresenting their numbers. Personal biases, statistical inade-
quacies, and irrelevance are terms that pertain to inappropriate uses of measure-
ment. Blaming the subjects is manifest in conceptions of floating, uninformed, or 
unstable voters, and volatile masses – all of with have a slightly negative conno-
tation and point to properties of public opinion that do not quite fit what the 
theory of measurement requires. However, the theory and methodology of meas-
urement and the conception of public opinion adopted by public opinion re-
searchers is rarely if ever questioned.  
A recent book (Bishop, 2005) questions the reality of public opinion by ex-
plaining the often tremendous variations of polling results by the way interview 
questions are formulated. The inclusion of questions that allow answers like “do 
not know,” “not sure,” and “no opinion,” for example, can generate fictional 
distributions. But his well-researched criticism and conclusion that American 
public opinion polls create the illusion of public opinion stays entirely within the 
paradigm of measurement theory. 
Although it would be hard to justify measuring something without knowing 
what it is that is being measured – which leads Bishop (ibid.) to consider public 
opinion an illusion – pollsters seem to have no qualms in publishing the results 
of their measuring efforts as objective “findings” and appeal to scientific meth-
ods to assure their acceptance. One way out of this obvious but rarely acknowl-
edged epistemological dilemma is to consider public opinion defined operation-
ally. Operational definitions define phenomena in terms of how a known measur-
ing device responds. For physicists, time is what a standard clock measures; and 
distance the number of an agreed units on a yardstick between two points. The 
criterion for operational definitions is not truth but replicability (and perhaps 
utility). I contend that pollsters unwittingly construct the phenomenon of public 
opinion by means of the data generating devices they happen to apply. Slightly 
generalizing this insight, public opinion is the artifact of how public opinion 
researchers conduct themselves in public, which includes the questions they ask 
of their interviewees, what they do with them, and how they publish their find-
ings, as will be discussed in the following. Operational definitions are not un-
usual, nor objectionable, except for the pollsters’ epistemologically naïve and 
methodologically unsustainable claims that their research results represent public 
opinion the way it is. But how do the data that pollsters generate come about? 
What is the social reality that polling operationalizes? 
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3 What pollsters actually do 
What happens when pollsters meet public opinion? Do they?  
And if they don’t, what is the empirical ground of its construction? 
Many answers 
for each 
  Battery of questions 
Σ
Tabulations 
Many individual interviews 






Pollsters’ claims regarding public opinion are mostly based on data. But what do 
public opinion researchers do to establish the ground for their claims?  
To start with the basics, the point of contact between researchers and their 
object of research consists of asking the interviewees in a sample of individuals a 
battery of identical questions and recording their answers. Asking questions is 
natural and human, but in the hand of pollsters, the ensuing interpersonal ex-
changes are very strange indeed, almost designed to prevent the public nature of 
public opinion from being recognizable in the pollsters’ data.  
In public settings, people speak in view of being held accountable by others 
for what they say or do – by others who might applaud or not be satisfied with 
what they are hearing, contribute their own beliefs to the conversation, or are 
determined to convince others of their own views. In such processes the crucial 
difference between public and individual opinions becomes apparent. Public 
opinions do not reside in any one’s head but in the interactions among people 
who have expectations of how the opinions held by others relate to their own. 
Consider three observations of how polling data relate to processes in which 
public opinions arise. 
First, pollsters interview individuals separate from each other. This practice 
is required for individual responses to be countable. Frequencies are not mean-
ingful unless the units of enumeration are freely permutable and independent of 
each other. This purely mathematical requirement for counting individuals re-
sponses leads to the injunction against interviewing individuals jointly, as con-
tributors to conversations, and as participants in networks within which opinions 
are sorted out, negotiated, and consented to or dismissed.  
Pierre Bourdieu (1979) argues that there are political and moral questions. 
Political questions implicate how other members of the public would respond to 
them and answering them requires taking a political position. In his terms, politi-
cal opinions are ‘mobilized’ through group interactions, which escape the aggre-
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gation of individual expressions. Political opinions are not reducible to moral 
judgements (although I would say that moral judgements can hardly be separated 
from their political consequences). Nevertheless, Bourdieu supports the point 
being made here. 
There is also another omission. If public opinion is a process of deliberation 
among people who have at least something in common with each other – from 
common political interests to finding themselves in the same neighbourhood bar 
– interviewing what pollsters call a ‘cross section’ of the population suspends 
that process altogether. By a cross section, pollsters mean a representative sam-
ple of individuals from a population, which is constructed according to a theory 
and presumed to exist at a temporal moment, cut off from its continuous time-
line, a ‘snap shot’ of that population. Cross sections not only disrupt the ongoing 
conversations in which individual opinions can become public opinions, they 
also bring individuals into a study that have – in a truly representative sample 
ideally nothing in common except for their membership in the population and 
would most unlikely communicate with each other in reality. This methodologi-
cal practice filters the process out of public opinion as well. 
Discounting the interpersonal and temporal nature of public opinion in favor 
of individual attributes could have ideological or cultural explanations. It is not 
surprising that this practice goes well with the Western ideal of human beings as 
rational and autonomous individuals and the consequent relegation of social 
phenomena as subordinate to individual cognition. It also gels with the Western 
democratic ideal of one citizen one vote (Champagne (2004). Finally, it has eco-
nomic implications: interviewing individuals is cheaper than studying prolonged 
deliberations among citizens in bars, public parks, and town hall meetings. All of 
these possible motivations have nothing to do with what happens where public 
opinions are formed. 
Symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer (1948) observed the same flaw but 
in slightly different terms. Arguing that society is not merely the sum of dispa-
rate individuals but of organic relationships among individuals, he invited poll-
sters to incorporate these sociological concepts into public opinion research. It 
would imply, he suggested, that public opinion researchers investigate various 
functional groups instead of simply aggregating individual responses. Blumer’s 
image of society was central to the Chicago School of sociology. His call for 
pollsters to join the explanatory paths of the social sciences, the way he saw 
them, was not heeded. 
Second, to gain analyzable responses, public opinion researchers restrict 
their data as follows: 
? The opinions studied are preconceived by the public opinion researcher and 
limited to those that are relevant to the researcher’s objectives. The inter-
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viewees are not allowed to participate in conceptualizing what matters to 
them. 
? To elicit easily analyzable responses, answers to interview questions are 
formulated in advance of the interviewing process as well. Interviews by 
pollsters tend to be what is called structured. This forces interviewees to 
speak within the predefined limits of pollsters’ expectations. Creative an-
swers to interviewer questions are ruled out. 
? Communication between standardized (trained) interviewers and (naïve or 
natural) interviewees amounts to making choices among a fixed number of 
question-answer pairs, one answer per question, serially provided by the in-
terviewer. Such choices have not the faintest resemblances to ordinary con-
versations among ordinary citizens.  
? For fear of biasing the responses, no provisions are made for interviewees to 
ask about what these questions mean, to inquire about why they are being 
asked, or to negotiate with the interviewee about the best way to express in-
dividual concerns. Interviewees are prevented from saying what is on their 
mind and unless it fits the pollster’s question-answer pairs, it is considered 
“not applicable” or “no response.”   
In other words, interviewees are merely used to confirm the categories of the 
researchers’ preconceived opinions. While the designers of interview question 
undoubtedly are concerned that their wording is understood and the answers 
provided are meaningful, the interview situation created under these conditions 
provides no clue to how questions are conceived, no way to confirm what the 
answers mean to those who give them, no way to check whether the choices 
among alternative responses are relevant in the public life of interviewees, in-
cluding whether interviewees had ever contemplated or discussed the issues in 
question with fellow citizen, that is, whether they are public as opposed to pri-
vately held opinions. What the polling data mean to the interviewees remains 
entirely uncertain. 
To assure that interviewees understand the polling questions alike, it would 
not be impossible to measure the reliability of the polling data, as is customary in 
content analysis. This, however, is uncommon. The few studies known to have 
asked the same questions repeatedly were designed to test interviewer biases and 
the like, not to ascertain whether the concerns of the researchers have anything to 
do with the concerns of the interviewees. 
Third, not only are the so-called public opinion data restricted to opinions 
that are preconceived by pollsters, perhaps most important is the fact that inter-
views are conducted in a severely constrained communication situation, a situa-
tion that bears little resemblance to what happens where public opinions arise. 
When individuals are recruited to be interviewed, they still are free agents, able 
 Klaus Krippendorff 138 
to refuse participation, inquire into compensation for their time, ask what is ex-
pected of them, and request to know what the data would be used for. At this 
point, communication still is relatively open. Interviewers and potential inter-
viewees are partners in conversation.  
Accepting to be interviewed means entering into a semi-contractual rela-
tionship with the interviewer, promising to play the role of an interviewee and 
subjecting him or herself to the interviewer’s systematic probing. In such asym-
metrical communication relationship, interviewees are asked to defer questioning 
what happens to them, committing themselves to respond truthfully, not politi-
cally, and to answer all and only the interviewer’s questions, not their own. To 
reinforce compliance with this inequality, interviewers present themselves as 
representatives of a polling organization and are trained to play the role of stan-
dard interviewers: impersonal, interchangeable, neutral, and following a proto-
col.  
The literature is full of examples of how power inequalities of this kind af-
fect communication: People tend to please their interviewers, try to figure out 
what the “correct” answer should be, answer questions even when they have no 
clue about what is involved, try to be politically correct, and avoid giving embar-
rassing answers. Interviewers are also discouraged from explaining what their 
questions and answers mean for fear that such explanations could influence in-
terviewees’ choices, which it they surely would, why else would anyone ask? 
Whatever transpires in such contrived interviewing situations, the data generated 
therein, are less about what people would say or do in public than about how 
they respond to such severely constrained communication situations. Thus poll-
ing data reflect the consensual power of interviewers over interviewees. 
In sum, by interviewing individuals separately, the intersubjectivity within 
which the public is manifest is eliminated from so-called public opinion data. By 
bringing only predetermined question-answer pairs to the interviewees attention, 
polling data merely confirm the pollsters’ concepts of relevant public issues, not 
the interviewees’. And by getting, often paying, people to conform to the com-
municationally confining interviewee role, the interviewer exercises unchal-
lengeable institutional control over what can transpire during an interview, and 
what counts as data reflects the power relationship at work at the point of contact 
between pollsters and members of the public.  
Polling literally creates a social situation whose effects it records. Pollsters 
seem blind, not realizing that the power relationships that operate during inter-
views become inscribed in the data being generated: complying with instruc-
tions, being paid for participation, communicating with detached or anonymous 
interviewers, and prevented from talking about what really matters to them.  
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4 Theories of public opinion reflecting analytical procedures 
Are theories of public opinion theories about what analysts do with their data? 




Many individual opinions (4) Theories of public opinion 
derived from polling practices 
 
 
The situation described above generates a typically large number of answers to a 
battery of questions for statistical analysis. Because interviewers are trained to be 
opinionless, unvarying, and standardized, it is common to discard evidence of 
interviewer involvement by removing references to them from these data.  
What remains is a collection of question-answer pairs that is categorized by 
how interviewees responded. Testing scientific hypotheses on such data amounts 
to aggregating what falls into these categories: absolute frequencies, percentages, 
and distributional characteristics in various cross tabulations. Analysts consider 
themselves free to organize such data sets in any conceptually convenient man-
ner, which assumes, according to measurement theory, that data points are freely 
permutable and represent demonstrably independent phenomena. The foregoing 
analysis suggested that the intersubjective nature of public opinion does not meet 
this condition. Thus, ignoring the public nature of public opinion occurs not only 
when generating interview data, but also in the process of analysing them. 
Recall also that polling data are generated in contrived communication 
situations that bear little resemblance to what happens in public. In measurement 
theory, this bias is called a systematic as opposed to a random measuring error. 
Random errors cause a frequency distribution to spread; systematic errors cause 
the data to deviate from a true mean. Because analysts of polling data cannot 
know the truth about public opinion outside of their data, systematic errors can-
not be recognized in polling data – unless it comes to the fore by other means, in 
the form of public actions, for example, monies raised for a cause, changes in the 
stock market, consumption, voting, demonstrations, or riots. Random errors are 
more easily analysed but are not the primary target of opinion research. But sys-
tematic errors enter uncertainties into the findings that one cannot measure, 
hence the importance of a critical analysis of the kind here provided. This leads 
to the conclusion that the usual pollsters’ claim that their public opinion polls 
represent the opinion of a public amount to a leap of faith. 
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Aggregation is always guided by the belief that a multiplicity of phenomena 
joins in a larger effect or concept of interest, here, in the public as constituted by 
what its members say in conversation. It would stand to reason that the manner 
in which data are aggregated should model or at least acknowledge how the 
multiplicity of interviewees join in that larger effect. Aggregating intra-
individual interview data is justifiable by psychological theories, for example, of 
how several seemingly separate attitudes are the result of prejudices or ideolo-
gies, which can be tested by clustering the question-answer pairs of individuals 
in the sample. By contrast, in aggregating data on the inter-individual phenom-
ena of public opinion, one would expect researchers to draw on social or political 
models of how public opinion arises in the interaction among individual citizens. 
This is not the case, however. 
By considering their enumeration, cross tabulation, and computation of 
more abstract statistical indices on interview data justified, public opinion re-
searchers in effect adopt a notion of the public as a frequency distribution of 
individual responses. This mechanistic, apolitical, and non-communicational 
model of public is an artefact of the analytical tools in use, not explainable from 
the data. 
To qualify there are conditions under which the mathematical or statistical 
operations that generate polling results may well represent situations in which 
public processes absent, and the larger effect or concept are indeed manifest in 
frequency distributions of individual opinions and actions. Two examples may 
suffice. The obvious one is political elections, which are decided by counting 
individual votes, one citizen one vote, just as when aggregating individual opin-
ions statistically. We know of the notoriously unreliable election forecasts during 
the deliberative phase of an election campaign. Forecasts become better when 
data are obtained closer to an election date, as more voters have made up their 
mind and are no longer open to the influence from others. Exit polls are most 
successful precisely because for voters who leave the voting booths, deliberation 
has ended. But predictions based on exit polls merely beat the election results by 
a few hours, are perturbed only by sampling errors, and can hardly be construed 
a success story for pollsters. The other example is opinion research in the service 
of marketing. Here, the opinions of interest to manufacturers concern the sales of 
products in the market. When these products are bought by individual consum-
ers, one unit at a time, and without much discussion with other consumers, then 
consumer choices may well resemble statistical distributions, more so than when 
such discussions would take place and influence these choices. 
The more the public reality deviates from these atomistic accounts, the more 
do the theories of public opinion that are computed as such become theories of 
how analysts choose to aggregate their interview data.  
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5 Economic correlations 















(5) Economic dependencies 
Costly data 
 
To understand the results of public opinion research, one has to consider its em-
beddedness in a web of political and economic interests. Polling is expensive and 
polling results must be sellable to those who have a use for them and the re-
sources to finance the effort of gathering costly data. Subscribing to rigorous 
scientific standards is not entirely incompatible with the need to sell findings. In 
the natural sciences, sponsored research is common. Fuelled largely by national 
interests – defence, administration, and technological or international develop-
ment – research results in the sciences are expected to have unanticipated eco-
nomic benefits elsewhere and they often do. But in sponsored public opinion 
research, the questions posed by sponsors are more directly linked to economic 
concerns and the use of scientific methods of polling has economic benefits as 
well. To elaborate, three observations will suffice. 
First, having shown that, on the one hand, the powerful agency of public 
opinion is based on the metaphorical construction of an abstraction, and that, on 
the other hand, polling results are the artifacts of the way data are generated, 
processed and analysed, it would seem difficult to justify the tremendous effort 
required to generate what in the end are questionable results. However, this is not 
so. This seeming contradiction is ‘resolved’ by institutionalizing the correlation 
between the flow of economic resources that pay for generating data and the 
research questions being pursued and answered. Sponsors of public opinion polls 
have specific research questions in mind for which they need specific answers. 
Pollsters translate the sponsors’ questions and the answers they are paying to 
obtain into questions that interviewees can respond to. Notwithstanding the pos-
sibility of pollsters piggybacking additional questions to sponsored research, 
because polling agencies must demonstrate the usefulness of their findings to 
their clients, the questions that end up being answered through public opinion 
research are the questions that generate the needed resources; and these may 
have little to do with what ordinary people are thinking or concerned with.  
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This is not to say that polling results are necessarily biased when commis-
sioned by special interest groups as pollsters like Gallup, Converse and Verba 
are eager to assure the public. The point to come back to below is that the ques-
tions of interest flow with the resources needed to answer them. 
Second, polling is conservative of its preconceptions. The parties with 
vested interest in public opinion mostly know the possible answers to their ques-
tions but are not sure which will turn up to be correct and to what extent. There-
fore, the task of polling agencies rarely is to find something new or unexpected 
but to validate or invalidate what their sponsors had in mind. Newness, if it en-
ters public opinion research at all, is likely to come from elsewhere. 
Third, the use of scientific methods by pollsters essentially serves as two 
rhetorical bypasses of the epistemological uncertainties associated with polling 
results, both serve ultimately economic functions:  
? To provide clients with the assurance that they can trust the research results, 
and rely on its findings – surprisingly without ever speaking of validity, of 
what the data represent, and what polls actually refer to. 
? To establish the pollsters’ credibility vis-à-vis their clients, and when polling 
results are published, also concerning their peers and the public. Being able 
to handle scientific methods is a ticket into the business of polling. 
The pollsters’ clients pay for both, scientifically processed answers to their ques-
tions, and the reputation of the polling organization they hire. The use of scien-
tific methods in effect substitutes for the uncertainties about what polling data 
mean, which pollsters cannot remove. Elections are interesting in this regard. 
Citizens may perceive them as a sport in which their vote will eventually play a 
role. Someone will win for sure. But the ‘intermediate score’ that pollsters pro-
vide may be perceived to be about how well the candidates are doing, but in fact 
are colored by the interests of those who pay for the questions to be asked. The 
answers to these questions constitute the ‘score.’ Often, political campaign man-
agers have a better sense of the public than what the rough percentages of polling 
results can tell. But what pollsters can provide and interested parties are willing 
to pay for is some measure of the economic risk involved in investing in one 
campaign or the other – often couched in terms of statistical significance. 
Thus, given these economic correlations, what surfaces as public opinion is 
a statistics that sponsors are willing to pay for, pollsters are capable of translating 
into analysable question-answer pairs, and among which individual interviewees 
can choose. Pollsters can hardly afford bypassing economically profitable ques-
tions but making their results credible is what consumes most of their costs. 
From an economic perspective the concerns of ordinary citizens seem insignifi-
cant and unworthy of attention. 
The Social Construction of Public Opinion  143
6 Public opinion as recursively constituted in what the public does with it 
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There are public opinion polls that are proprietary and others that are published. 
Both affect, create, or construct public opinion but rather differently. 
Proprietary polls, to start with them, are paid for by institutions with strate-
gic interest in public opinion. Proprietary polling results are effective to the ex-
tent they inform the communicative efforts of their sponsors to change undesir-
able polling results into desirable ones. I speak of “polling results,” not of public 
opinion, because what ordinary people do with messages that are aimed at 
changing their minds is an empirical question that cannot be answered by further 
polling. There are numerous methods that go beyond interviewing people; con-
tent analysis, for one; psychological experiments, for another, evaluating the 
persuasiveness of appeals. There are also ways of measuring correlates of public 
opinion changes – consumer spending, attendance in rallies, and the size of dem-
onstrations. But if a sponsor acts on proprietary polling results, to assess the 
effectiveness of their interventions, these effects must be translated back into 
polling results. Hence, at least one important measure of the effects of actions 
taken on accounts of proprietary polling results is the change in future proprie-
tary polling results – regardless of what they mean. Here ‘public opinion’ ap-
pears in a recursion. Interested parties change present polling results into future 
polling results. Polls feed on themselves without break. 
Published polling results, by contrast, can affect public opinion on three 
levels; all three are involved in another recursion: 
? They can inform members of the public about how pollsters and interested 
parties see the distribution of opinions in a population. Published polls often 
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are the only clues for people to come to know about the opinions of others 
beyond their ability to communicate with them directly. 
? They can provide members of the public the choice of accepting polling 
results as adequate accounts of a public beyond direct experiences, or reject 
them completely or in parts, whatever the reason maybe. Since pollsters’ 
reputation is at stake here, citations of the scientific methodology used in 
developing their findings is the most common rhetorical devices that poll-
sters have available. 
? Once accepted, polling results can also enable members of the public to 
locate themselves within the distribution of published opinions and act ac-
cording to the place at which they find themselves in that distribution. Pub-
lic actions in response to knowing one’s location within a distribution of 
opinions are not so simple. For example, when finding to be in the majority, 
people may enjoy being in that place, see no reason to do anything, to vote, 
for example, and might by this abstinence cause public opinion to shift its 
distribution. When in the minority, people may become energized to convert 
opponents in their community. They may also make an effort to blend into 
the majority by adopting their opinions, or become silenced by the apparent 
hopelessness of the situation as published. The latter is what Noelle Neu-
mann (1993) theorized as ‘spiral of silence.’ But fitting oneself into a pub-
lished distribution has far broader implications. 
In either case, biased or not, addressing true public concerns or not, published 
polling results have a good chance of entering the conversations of those repre-
sented therein and thereby become part of public opinion. Polling results that 
nobody cares to publish, read, discuss, or act upon simply are ineffective. Polling 
results that compel people into accepting them become self-evidently real. 
Obviously, the mass media participate decisively in the formation of public 
opinion – not because of their reporting on unexpected happenings or issues for 
individual attention or public scrutiny (their agenda-setting function); not be-
cause they cater to very large audiences, (homogenizing them); not because they 
are the means of industry’s manipulatory efforts (generating income); but be-
cause they assertedly report on the concerns of people that ordinarily cannot be 
reached conversationally, people that are just like those who expose themselves 
to the published polls. Polls thus expand the public beyond individual reach. The 
scientific arguments for this expansion tend to mystify many, but which news 
media to trust and therefore attend to does not. By making polling results plausi-
ble to mass audiences, the media participate in constructing public opinion, while 
giving the impression of merely reporting it. 
According to Son-Ho Kim (2005a), in the mid 1970s, the mass media 
started to recognize the news value of polling results and began to establish their 
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own polling operations. Kim (2005b) suggests that this shift resulted from the 
failure of commercial opinion polls during the 1972 U.S. Presidential election. 
Renowned pollsters like Gallup, Harris, Mitofsky, and Yankelovich testified in 
the U.S. Congress on the credibility of commissioned opinion polls and failed to 
agree on acceptable standards. He suggests that pollsters, in response to being 
accused of political biases, were eager to associate themselves with the suppos-
edly fair news media. This shift did not change the polling methods, however. It 
merely shifted control over the polling questions from those with direct eco-
nomic or political interests in the public to those thriving on the newsworthiness 
of polling results (cf. Schudson 1998: 224). In this new environment, polling 
questions came to be designed not to objectively report on the concerns of the 
public but to create news, i.e., generate findings that would surprise the public 
and attract audiences from news channels that reported less exciting opinion 
statistics. This shift did not affect the economics of polling either. It merely hid 
the economic interests in polling behind the competition among media for adver-
tising dollars. This shift also demonstrates that adherence to scientific procedures 
is subordinate to the politics of objectivity, to the choice of a credible channel for 
disseminating polling results. 
In the preceding figure, one may recognize the essential circularity within 
which public opinion is constructed. Once public opinion polls enter the delib-
erations in the public sphere – whether in the form of polling results or manipu-
lative efforts to change previous findings – they do have a chance to become true 
and re-enter future polling results. To have the capability of feeding on itself, 
polling results must make public sense, of course, pass their critics’ scrutiny, 
survive their commentators’ criticism, do not contradict common experiences, 
and circulate within the public, through its institutions, and back.  
Pollsters may have little to stand on when claiming that their findings repre-
sent the opinions of a public. But, by making compelling cases of them, filling 
the void of what cannot be experienced in public conversations and offering the 
members of the public a sense of where they stand, polls may well create what 
pollsters believe to be merely reporting. This includes reifying the image of pub-
lic opinion as a powerful ruler to be feared or at least to be taken seriously. 
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7 Public sphere as a self-organizing system  
Can those involved in constructing public opinion escape their own constructions? 
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The foregoing leads to the conclusion that public opinion does not exist as public 
opinion researchers claim it does but might be recognized in the effects of pub-
lishing the polling results and the efforts by various economically and politically 
motivated attempts to alter them. Even the most neutral social theories can affect 
what they theorize when reentering the process they claim to theorize (cf. Krip-
pendorff 1996). This recursion is evident here as well. 
All social constructions are constituted in the understanding that their con-
stituents have of it and enact. Public opinion is no exception. It is constituted in 
concepts of public opinion for which numerous institutions compete – advertis-
ing, public relations, the mass media, politics, journalism, and last but not least 
the science of polling – each pursuing its own interests in shaping the concept of 
public opinion in its favour, and each relying on pollsters, social researchers, and 
relevant media to record and publicize it. These competing interest in the public 
result in a medley of what polling agencies are paid to say, what academic opin-
ion researchers attempt to generalize, what the mass media deem worthy of pub-
lication, but, most importantly, of what the multiplicity of citizens discuss among 
themselves, including about distant others who are expected to engage in similar 
public discourse. As such, public opinion appears as a self-organizing system 
that preserves the uneasy network of conceptions of itself – not necessarily 
shared and certainly not fixed – within a boundary that is continuously perturbed 
by unexpected (truly new) happenings and by political opposition to this very 
institutionalization. 
Thus, I am suggesting that public opinion should not be separated from its 
constituents, from the deliberations among ordinary people, pollsters, politicians, 
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and social scientists about what public opinion is for them. It is important to 
recognize the socially-politically constructed nature of the concept. Also, it 
would be a mistake to generalize one concept of public opinion at the expense of 
all others. It would destroy the deliberations that constitute the public, which a 
good theory of public opinion should make an effort to explain. If pollsters 
would have their say, the public nature of public opinion would disappear in 
favor of a collection of individual opinions. If commercial interests were to 
dominate the conception of public opinion, we would all become compliant con-
sumers of profitable products. If politicians were to lead the way, we would all 
become followers of one kind of ideology or another. Journalists prefer to sim-
plify public opinion in such binary terms as pro and con, agreements and dis-
agreements, taking one position on a subject or the alternative, voting for one 
candidate or her opponent, or good guys and bad guys. Academic opinion re-
searchers find it easier to regard a public atomistically, which allows them to 
scale, dimensionalize, cluster, or correlate the data and predict future distribu-
tions (not necessarily of individuals). As a social construction, public opinion 
resides in the interactions among its constituents who have competing concep-
tions of it. I do not think that this amounts to a domestication of public opinion, 
as Benjamin Ginsberg (1986) suggests, rendering the public docile and govern-
able by the state. There are much too many competing interests involved for 
public opinion to be settled one way or another. I side more with Philip Converse 
(1996) here, who argues that polling has not replaced the political participation 
of people. If the institutions that struggle for dominance within the self-
organizing system of public opinion do not leave enough space for dialogue and 
deliberation on what is important to the members of the public, then public un-
rest, civil disobedience, revolts, and even terrorism may well provide opportuni-
ties for the public to reassert itself and recapture the lost openness within its ever 
shifting self. 
Is public opinion a single simple social construction? I would say no. Can 
those tinkering with different aspects of public opinion escape the effects of their 
own constructions? I would doubt it. 
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